This paper examines how employer access to criminal history data influences the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders and non-offenders using detailed self-reported criminal history data and labor market variables from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and a dataset I collected on state policies toward criminal history records. Specifically, are the labor market effects of incarceration stronger and longer lasting in states that provide public access to criminal history records? Do non-offenders who are otherwise similar to exoffenders have improved labor market outcomes when employers can verify their records of non-offense? I test if these effects vary by race in the context of possible statistical discrimination by employers. I find evidence that employment effects of incarceration are more negative and last longer in states that provide criminal history records over the Internet than in states that do not. There is some evidence that ex-offenders have lower wages in those states with open records policies.
Introduction
The rapid increase in incarceration in the United States is well documented. From 1980 to 2004, the number of inmates sentenced under State and Federal jurisdiction per 100,000 population increased from 139 to 486 (Beck 2000, Harrison and Beck 2005) . A concurrent phenomena has increased the probability that an employer can learn about the criminal history of a potential applicant. In the last ten years, many criminal history records have become available over the Internet and employers have made criminal background checks a routine part of pre-employment screening. Recent research has attempted to explain generally how conviction or periods of incarceration affect the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders, but variation in employer access to criminal history data is likely to influence these effects. This paper examines how employer access to criminal history data influences the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders and non-offenders. Specifically, are the labor market effects of incarceration larger in states that provide public access to criminal history records? There are a number of reasons to believe that employer access to criminal history data may influence the labor market effects of incarceration. First, if employers are unlikely to know precisely how a potential applicant that is an ex-offender will perform once hired, then the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders will be worse in states that have open criminal history records policies. Second, the negative labor market effects of incarceration may last longer under an open criminal records policy. Using detailed self-reported criminal history data and labor market variables from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I find evidence that employment effects are more negative and last longer in states that provide criminal history records over the Internet than in states that do not. There is some evidence that ex-offenders have lower wages in those states with open records policies.
Publicly available criminal history records may also affect the labor market outcomes of some non-offenders, who are otherwise similar to ex-offenders. If employers statistically discriminate in the absence of criminal criminal data, they will use correlates of criminality or incarceration as proxies for those variables. In the U.S., the incarcerated population tends to be more black (and to a lesser extent more Hispanic), more male, less educated, and younger than the population as a whole. If non-offenders who fall into these categories have poor labor market outcomes 1 as a result of statistical discrimination, they may also benefit from the availability of criminal history records. Thus, there is a scenario for testing whether employers statistically discriminate.
I find little evidence that increasing employer access to criminal history data has affected the labor market outcomes of non-offenders, but it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about whether employers are statistically discriminating in the absence of criminal history data.
The results of this paper are important for understanding the transition of ex-offenders back into the legitimate labor force and public policies about the public availability of criminal history records. As the flow of released prisoners increases over the next ten years, the issue of re-entry into the legitimate labor market will force policymakers to consider the unintended consequences of open criminal history records.
The paper is structured as follows. First, I outline recent changes in the availability of criminal background data and how these policy changes are operationalized for the study. Then, I consider how more open criminal history records may affect ex-offenders and non-offenders, and review the literature related to the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders and the labor market effects of pre-employment screening. Next, I describe the data. Regression results follow, and then I conclude.
Expanded availability of criminal background data
A criminal history record positively identifies an individual and describes that person's arrests and subsequent dispositions relating to a criminal event. They have been around for at least 100 years, and have until recently been used primarily for law enforcement purposes. Criminal history records have been legally available for public use since the 1976 case Paul v. Davis, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the publication of official acts, including arrest, conviction, and incarceration records, were not protected by privacy rights. 1 The widespread use of criminal background checks as a pre-employment screen is a relatively new phenomenon, stemming from new legal availability and technical improvements that have made records more accessible.
Some of the recent use of background checks in hiring has been mandated by state legislation, such as for positions in the healthcare, education, and security industries. Most new use, however, 1 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) .
2 has been voluntary. Employers show a strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal records.
In a 2001 survey of employers, more than 60% would "probably not" or "definitely not" hire an ex-offender (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2005) . Those more likely to have committed crime or been incarcerated may lack skills that are valued in legitimate employment.
Employers may also be hesitant to hire ex-convicts because of the risk of negligent hiring suits.
Negligent hiring can occur when an employee causes injury to a customer or co-worker, and the employer failed to take reasonable action in hiring that could have prevented the injury. Although the incidence of negligent hiring suits can be small, the potential monetary costs can be quite large. 2 A 2004 survey of human resource managers found that 3% of their firms had been accused of negligent hiring in the three years before the survey (Burke 2005) . Employers are most averse to hiring ex-offenders convicted of violent crimes and for positions in service industries where customer interaction is common, which is consistent with a risk of negligent hiring (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004) .
Employer use of criminal background checks may also decrease workplace theft and fraud, improve discipline, and hence lower monitoring costs, which are known to be substantial (Dickens, Katz, Lang, and Summers 1989) . Expanded applicant screening, for all the reasons above, may also lower insurance costs for firms. Given the risks and the relatively low cost of conducting criminal background checks, human resource practitioners now recommend conducting checks on all hires (Andler and Herbst 2003, Rosen 2006) . Most frequently, employers conduct criminal background checks prior to hiring and so before productivity is directly observed (Holzer et al. 2004) .
When an employer decides to conduct a criminal background check, she faces a range of options in terms of who to have conduct the search, how broad the search will be geographically (within county, within state, or multi-state), and how much the search will cost. Private providers of background checks are plentiful, but the accuracy or depth of their searches are not guaranteed to be any better than if an employer conducts the check itself (Briggs, Thanner, Bushway, Taxman, and Van Brakle 2004) . A few of these firms aggregate data across jurisdictions and are capable of performing broad searches. In reality, employers have no access to a national criminal 2 The extremely low cost of criminal background checks may be the primary cause of increased attention to negligent hiring. If an employee with a violent criminal past attacks a customer or co-worker, an employer can be accused of negligence for failing to order a $30 criminal history report that would have identified the applicant's criminal record. See Odewahn and Webb (1989) , Johnson and Indvik (1994) , and Connerley, Arvey, and Bernardy (2001) for a background on negligent hiring. 3 background check. The FBI maintains the only national repository of criminal records, known as the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The NCIC is not, however, accessible to the general public. In lieu of a national search, most employers settle for a localized search of criminal records. Before widespread use of the Internet, an employer who wanted a check might dispatch an employee to the local county courthouse and request a criminal records search in person. Even today, most criminal history data is generated by county courthouses. Employers seeking a wider search of criminal history data can use state databases that aggregate local and state arrest, conviction, and incarceration records. Recently, some states have started to provide public access to these databases via the Internet. 3 Not only do employers have newer ways of accessing criminal history databases, but they can now be more certain that those databases are complete and accurate. From 1993 to 2001, the number of individuals in state criminal record databases has increased from more than 47 million to more than 64 million (SEARCH, Inc. 1994 , Brien 2005 . Over the same period, the proportion of all criminal history records that were automated increased from 79% to 89% (SEARCH, Inc. 1994 , Brien 2005 . This nationwide automation was facilitated by the National Criminal History Improvement Program, which was mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. 4 The Act imposed a five-day waiting period for firearm purchases and required that prospective gun owners clear background checks during that waiting period. The Act also stipulated that, within five years of its effective date, such checks should be performed instantaneously through a national criminal background check system maintained by the Department of Justice, and allocated funds to encourage automation of state records. Since 1995, the states have received approximately $400 million for this purpose (Brien 2005) . This funding has been used to automate records, improve the update time (i.e., speed the time between when a criminal history event occurs and when it is entered into a state-level database), and lower the number of errors in the criminal history databases. States have been able to provide access to the criminal histories over the Internet because, in part, they were mandated to fully automate those systems. The ongoing expansion of access to criminal history records is the policy variation central to this paper's research design. This is discussed in detail in the data section.
3 See Rosen (2006) and Hinton (2004) for thorough discussions of criminal background check sources and reliability. 
Data on state background check policies
As discussed earlier, the quantity of, quality of, and access to criminal history data have expanded greatly in the last 15 years. To evaluate the labor market consequences of these policy changes, I operationalize the policy that I argue has the greatest impact on employer access to criminal history records. The main policy variable Access st is equal to one if state s in year t provides online access to the criminal histories of individuals released from its prisons, and zero otherwise.
This variable is meant to measure a combined level of data accuracy and availability, rather than represent two states of the world, one with no information and one with complete information.
I collected this panel of policy data directly from state departments of correction or state police agencies, starting with a cross-section of the policies that is available in Legal Action Center (2004).
The Internet sites coded in my data allow any member of the public to search for ex-offenders who served their time in that state's prison system. In general, this will not be all prisoners, but rather prisoners who were sentenced to a year or more of prison time, but were not sentenced in federal court. Although this is a subset of all prisoners, this is the majority of the incarcerated population. The sites provide personal information that allow a searcher to positively identify an ex-offender. This information includes name and aliases, birthdate, physical characteristics, and race. The searches also detail the offenses for which time was served, the length of the sentences, and release dates for each offense. Some systems only identify current offenders, but this information is not useful to employers, so Access is coded as zero in this cases. One concern for my analysis is that there are underlying differences across adopting and nonadopting states that may be correlated with the access effect. 
Literature review and hypotheses

Labor market effects of incarceration
There are a number of reasons why employers may dislike hiring ex-offenders. Some employers may be legally restricted to preclude ex-offenders, such as in education, health, and security fields.
Time spent incarcerated may simply prevent offenders from accumulating work experience. An offender's existing skill base may also deteriorate while out of the labor market. Inmates may also lose access to social networks, which are important in job search. Employers may also believe that ex-offenders are generally untrustworthy.
Employers show a strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal records. In a 2001 survey of employers, more than 60% would "probably not" or "definitely not" hire an ex-offender (Holzer et al. 2005) . Those more likely to have committed crime or been incarcerated may lack skills that are valued in legitimate employment. Incarceration prevents offenders from accumulating work experience. Offenders may have chosen crime because they lacked job skills to begin with. Grogger (1995) finds that offenders in California have similarly low-employment rates before and after arrest, suggesting that criminality is not the primary factor but rather that offenders have underlying characteristics that make them less employable. Other studies have shown either negative effects of incarceration on employment and earnings (Freeman 1996) or negligible effects (Kling 2006) . By conducting background checks, employers may be able to hire more productive applicants and lower turnover.
Negligent hiring can occur when an employee causes injury to a customer or co-worker, and the employer failed to take reasonable action in hiring that could have prevented the injury. Although the incidence of negligent hiring suits can be small, the potential monetary costs can be quite large. 6 A 2004 survey of human resource managers found that 3% of their firms had been accused of negligent hiring in the three years before the survey (Burke 2005) . Employers are most averse to hiring ex-offenders convicted of violent crimes and for positions in service industries where customer interaction is common, which is consistent with a risk of negligent hiring (Holzer et al. 2004 ).
Employer use of criminal background checks may also decrease workplace theft and fraud, improve discipline, and hence lower monitoring costs, which are known to be substantial (Dickens et al. 1989) . Expanded applicant screening, for all the reasons above, may also lower insurance costs for firms. Given the risks and the relatively low cost of conducting criminal background checks, human resource practitioners now recommend conducting checks on all hires (Andler and Herbst 2003, Rosen 2006) . Most frequently, employers conduct criminal background checks prior to hiring and so before productivity is directly observed (Holzer et al. 2004) .
Most prisoners will leave prison at some point and choose to enter the labor market. Employers are often wary to hire ex-offenders, and much research has tried to determine the labor market effects of having served time in prison or jail. Determining the effect of incarceration (or conviction) on employment and wages is nontrivial if there is something unobservable about offenders relative to non-offenders that has led the former group to choose crime instead of legitimate employment exclusively. Economists have employed a variety of research methods to identify unbiased estimates of the effect of incarceration on employment and wages. Grogger (1995) compares the labor market outcomes of offenders before and after periods of incarceration. Kling (2006) uses variation in judge sentencing to instrument for individual sentence length. Another strategy is to use more homogeneous samples, such as those that will ever be convicted or incarcerated, an approach used by Grogger (1995), Western (2002) , Kling (2006) . This literature tends to find small, but statistically significant, effects of incarceration on wages and employment without sample restrictions. Once smaller, less heterogeneous samples are used, the estimates attenuate and commonly become insignificant.
negligence for failing to order a $30 criminal history report that would have identified the applicant's criminal record. See Odewahn and Webb (1989) , Johnson and Indvik (1994), and Connerley et al. (2001) for a background on negligent hiring.
Labor market effects of criminal background checks
Few studies have dealt directly with the labor market effects of criminal background checks. Holzer et al. (2005) use establishment data on employer use of criminal background checks and preferences toward hiring ex-offenders. They propose that firms that prefer not to hire ex-offenders will be more likely to hire black applicants if they also conduct background checks, and find some evidence that this is the case. While this research strategy does provide a useful analysis of which types of firms are more likely to use background checks, the endogeneity of the employer use of criminal background checks is a drawback. Employers that conduct criminal background checks may also have applicant pools for a higher proportion of black applicants. Some of the results are not robust once the authors control for the composition of each firm's applicant pool. This work is also based on surveys of employers from the early 1990s, and there may have been changes in how employers use criminal background checks and in the quality of information obtained from those checks. Bushway (1996) finds that the weekly earnings of young, black men with a high school degree were higher in states that had more of their criminal history records automated-a measurement he argues can serve as a proxy for record accessibility. In other work, Bushway (2004) uses a composite record openness score generated by the Legal Action Center (2004) . He finds that the ratio of black and white wages (employment probabilities) were higher (lower) in states that had higher openness scores, although neither estimate is significant. The observed effect on wages is consistent with large drops in employment if it is primarily low-skilled black men that are dropping out of the labor market. While Bushway is the first to use state variation to measure the labor market effects of criminal background checks, his work is cross-sectional, so it does not control for unobserved differences in labor markets across states particular to black men that are correlated with criminal records automation or accessibility.
In interviews, ex-offenders report a variety of responses to employer requests for information about their criminal backgrounds (Harding 2003) . Some ex-offenders prefer to be up-front about their records during the job search. Others offer no information, and hope that employers never find out. A third group are discouraged from applying in the first place, anticipated the stigma created by having a criminal record. Bushway (1996) suggests that wide availability of criminal 8 background checks may encourage ex-offenders to apply for jobs in which workers do not need to establish long-term trust with their employers (e.g., jobs requiring mostly manual labor or jobs with little customer interaction). This is supported by evidence from employer surveys in which employers in manufacturing, construction, or transportation industries declare a tolerance for hiring ex-offenders, but service sector employers do not (Holzer et al. 2004 ). However, employers who conduct criminal background checks are not necessarily less likely to hire ex-offenders (Holzer et al. 2004 ).
Data
Labor market and criminal history data come from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The NLSY97 includes a representative sample of all youths aged 12-16 years by the end of 1996, and an oversample of black and Hispanic youths meeting the same age restriction. Currently, the NLSY97 has released eight rounds of data, covering interviews I use three labor market outcomes as dependent variables: employment status, hourly wage, and annual earnings. Employment status is equal to one if the respondent was employed at the date of the interview. Hourly wage is the maximum of the NLSY-created hourly wage variables for each job held since the last interview. The earnings variable is the total income from wages and salary in the calendar year before the interview.
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The NLSY97 also has extensive self-reported information on interactions with the criminal justice system. Incarceration information comes from two types of questions. First, if the interview was conducted at a jail or the respondent classified their dwelling as a correctional institution, this was noted. Second, an iterative round of questions addressed any arrests and whether they led to conviction or incarceration. I created an indicator variable for whether the respondent was incarcerated at the time of the interview or since the date of the last interview. Since this research is about criminal history records that are limited to adult offenses, I also constructed an incarceration indicator that was restricted to adult incarcerations. Finally, a variable was created to indicate whether the respondent had ever been incarcerated as an adult up to the current interview.
I also include a number of other variables as controls. To control for labor market experience, I
use the NLSY-created variable denoting the number of weeks worked in an employer-type job, but rescale the variable into years of experience (years of experience squared is also included in each specification). To control for education, I use a dummy variable for whether the respondent has completed high school. Highest grade completed is not included as a control, however, because most respondents are still completing their schooling during the sample period. To account for macroeconomic conditions, the state-level unemployment rate is also included as a control. In cross-sectional regressions, the ASVAB score and race, ethnicity, and gender indicators serve as controls. Table 4 shows selected descriptive statistics for labor market outcomes, incarceration, and other covariates from the last survey round in which NLSY97 respondents participated. The employment rate at the end of the sample is 71%. Average wages are $9.86 and average annual earnings are about $14,000. Four percent of the sample has been incarcerated as an adult. The average age in the last reported interview is almost 22 years. Respondents report average work experience of about 4 years, which includes work experience as a minor. Average completed schooling is almost 13 years, although 30% of the sample is still enrolled in school at the end of the sample. Table 4 also details how ex-offenders and non-offenders differ across observable characteristics. Ex-offenders are significantly less likely to be employed (58% versus 72%, respectively).
Descriptives of variables
Despite the employment differential, the hourly wages of ex-offenders are not significantly different from the hourly wages of non-offenders. This might be explained by the higher rate of school enrollment of non-offenders (31% of non-offenders are enrolled, but only 7% of ex-offenders are enrolled). Ex-offenders also have fewer years of completed schooling and less labor market experience. Finally, the table shows the proportion of individuals that live in states that provide criminal history data over the Internet. Of the complete sample, 37% live in such a state, and ex-offenders are just as likely statistically to live in the an open-records state as non-offenders.
Descriptives of incarceration variables
This paper relies heavily on self-reported criminal history variables from the NLSY97 to distinguish ex-offenders from non-offenders. Table 5 shows the age profiles for adult-incarceration rates of NLSY97 respondents, broken down by gender, race, and ethnicity. The differences in incarceration probabilities across both gender and race are stark. Black males are about four times as likely as white males to be incarcerated at any particular age. Hispanic males are somewhat more likely to be incarcerated as white males, but not to the same extent as blacks. Males of any race are significantly more likely to be incarcerated than their female counterparts. These incarceration rates are qualitatively similar for men of these ages from other data sources, although the rates are somewhat lower. Using data from the 2000 Census, Raphael (2006) reports that 11% of black men aged 18-25 years and 2% of white men aged 18-25 years were incarcerated. This suggests that incarceration is underreported in the NLSY97. We will discuss later how this affects our results. Table 6 shows the cumulative age profiles for adult-incarceration rates of NLSY97 respondents, broken down by gender, race, and ethnicity. The gender and racial patterns of the age-specific incarceration probabilities are also seen in the cumulative rates. (Note that the cumulative rates are not monotonic because of the age structure of the respondents and survey non-response and 
Effect of incarceration on labor market outcomes
I first replicate basic results of how incarceration affects labor market outcomes. While a number of papers have consider these effects using other data, I know of no other papers that estimate labor market effects of incarceration using the more recent NLSY97. First estimating incarceration effects will allow us to put the background checks effects in the context of previous estimates of incarceration effects.
Panel regression models are estimated using three labor market outcome variables: employment status, hourly wage, and yearly earnings. The basic effect of incarceration is estimated in the following regression:
where Y iast is a labor market outcome of individual i, who is aged a years and lives in state s in year t. Inc it is an indicator for whether individual i has been incarcerated as an adult by year t, and so β 2 is the parameter of interest. X ist is a vector of controls, γ i is a vector of individual fixed effects, γ a is a vector of fixed effects for respondent age, and ε iast is an error term uncorrelated with the covariates. As discussed above, the estimate of β 2 from this regression should be an unbiased estimate of the labor market effects of incarceration if individual fixed effects are included and the unobserved differences between ex-offenders and non-offenders is time-invariant.
If this unobserved heterogeneity does vary over time, then we can get a less biased estimate of β 2 by restricting the sample to a more homogenous group, such as individuals who have all been convicted of a crime, even if some have not been incarceration. Table 7 shows estimates from the specification above. Employment status is the dependent variable in Columns 1-4. The estimated coefficient on Inc range from -4 to -6 percentage points, and all are statistically significantly different from zero. These estimates indicate that ex-offenders are about 5 percentage points less likely to be employed than non-offenders, even after controlling for time-invariant unobserved differences between the two groups. The specifications in Columns 3-4 also include the variable SinceInc, indicates how long the negative employment effects of incarceration may last. This coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the employmentstatus regression, although the sign is positive which is consistent with attenuating effects of incarceration on labor market outcomes over time.
In Columns 5-8 of Table 7 , the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. The estimated coefficients on Access are all negative, but inconsistently statistically significant. These estimates indicate that wages for ex-offenders are 2-4% lower than those of non-offenders. The estimated coefficients on SinceInc show that each year since incarceration decreases wages by an additional 2%, an effect that is significantly different from zero. In Columns 7-9 of Table 7 , the dependent variable is annual earnings. The estimated coefficients on Inc are all negative and statistically significantly different from zero. These estimates indicate that the annual earnings of ex-offenders are $2,000 lower for ex-offenders compared with non-offenders. For annual earnings, there also appears to be an increasing negative effect of incarceration. The estimated coefficients on SinceInc are about $-1,000 and significant from zero.
Access to criminal history data and the employment effects of incarceration
There are a number of reasons to believe that employer access to criminal history data may influence the labor market effects of incarceration. First, if employers are unlikely to know precisely how a potential applicant that is an ex-offender will perform once hired, then the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders will be worse in states that have open criminal history records policies.
Second, if employers are risk averse, the negative labor market effects of incarceration may last longer under an open criminal records policy. Moreover, even higher productivity ex-offenders 13 may have longer lasting employment problems if employer risk aversion prevents them from being hired in the first place.
The effect of wider availability of criminal history records on the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders is estimated in the following regression:
Recall that Access st is equal to one if state s has in Internet site in year t on which the public can search for the incarceration records of ex-offenders. Since records policies vary by state and over time, fixed effects are included for states and years (γ s and γ t , respectively). The parameter /beta 5 is the difference in the employment outcomes between ex-offenders in states with more open records versus ex-offenders in states with more closed records. The parameter /beta 6 measures the relative duration of the employment effects of incarceration in states with more open records. Table 8 shows estimates from the specification above. Employment status is the dependent variable in Columns 1-3. Although magnitudes on the coefficient on Access · Inc vary by specification, the sign is consistently negative, indicating that ex-offenders are less likely to be employed in states with Internet sites providing information about ex-offenders. The specification in Column 3 includes the variable SinceInc, and coefficient on Access · SinceInc indicates how long the negative employment effects of incarceration may last. This coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the employment-status regression, so availability of background checks does not appear to influence duration of incarceration effects.
In Columns 4-6 of Table 8 , the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. The estimated coefficients on Access · Inc are all negative and significantly different from zero. These estimates indicate that wages for ex-offenders are 8-15% lower in open-records states. The estimated coefficient on Access · SinceInc is not significantly different from zero. In Columns 7-9 of Table   8 , the dependent variable is annual earnings. The estimated coefficients on Access · Inc are all negative, but only one is significantly different from zero. These estimates indicate that wages for ex-offenders about $1000-3000 lower for ex-offenders in states with criminal-history-records Internet sites. Again here, there is no evidence that the availability of criminal history records affects 14 the duration of incarceration effects.
Background checks, race and gender, and the employment outcomes of non-offenders
In order to identify the effect of more widely available criminal history data on the labor market outcomes of non-offenders, I estimate a difference-in-differences (DD) estimator on a sample of non-offenders. This estimator is the difference in the outcomes of black men relative to white men, in states that adopted criminal history sites versus those that did not, before and after the adoption. In order to capture the effect of more available checks on individuals who are non-offenders from groups with a high proportion of ex-offenders, I use two strategies. In one model, the comparison is made across discrete categories of race, ethnicity, and gender. In another specification, I run regressions of incarceration on variables that are observable to potential employers (using the entire NLSY97 sample), and calculate predicted probabilities of incarceration. In the DD estimator with labor market outcomes, I compare the outcomes of non-offenders from highly offending groups with the outcomes of non-offenders from groups with lower predicted incarceration rates.
DD with race, ethnicity, and gender comparisons
In this first examination of the outcomes of non-offenders, I make comparisons across discrete categories of race, ethnicity, and gender. The effect of wider availability of criminal history records on the labor market outcomes of non-offenders is estimated in the following regression: 
In this regression, the reference group, white men, is compared with three demographic groups with differential incarceration probabilities: black men, Hispanic men, and women. The variable gressions show similar effects for women and black men, with some positive effects for Hispanic non-offenders, but only in the complete sample. In general, the estimates from these regressions are not estimated precisely enough to draw many conclusions about the effects of more available criminal records on the labor market outcomes of non-offenders. Moreover, it would be difficult to draw many conclusions about employer statistical discrimination on the basis of this evidence.
DD with predicted probabilities of incarceration
In trying to learn about whether employers statistically discriminate in the absence of criminal history data, we would like to compare the labor market outcomes of non-offenders from groups with high rates of incarceration with the labor market outcomes of groups with low rates of incarceration, in states that have open records policies versus states that do not. In last specifications, we considered racial and gender-based comparisons, given their incarceration differentials. Now, I consider a less parametric comparison by estimating predicted probabilities of incarceration using variables that any prospective employer is likely to be able to observe (and might use as a basis for statistical discrimination). Table 10 shows the estimates from a linear probability regression of an indicator for prior incarceration as an adult on race, ethnicity, gender, and education variables using observations from the last survey round in which each respondent participated. The specification in Column 1 shows a specification that includes highest grade completed, its squared value, and indicators for black men, Hispanic men, and women. The results show that schooling is negatively correlated with incarceration and that black men are significantly more likely than white men to be incarcerated.
The incarceration probabilities are not statistically significantly different between Hispanic and white men. Women are much less likely than white men to have been incarcerated. In Column 2, the schooling variables are interacted with the dummy variables. Inclusion of the interactions increases the importance of variation in schooling in explaining the variation in prior incarceration.
From these incarceration regressions, predicted probabilities of incarceration are generated for each observation. Since the regressions are cross-sectional, these predicted probabilities are not time-varying. This parametric assumption seems reasonable considering the small range of ages in the NLSY97 data.
The effect of wider availability of criminal history records on the labor market outcomes of non-offenders is estimated in the following regression:
where P robInc i is the predicted probability of incarceration for individual i from the model discussed above. The interaction effects of P robInc 2 i are included in case employer preferences with respect to an individual's probability of being an ex-offender are nonlinear. The main effects of P robInc i and P robInc 2 i are excluded from the regression, since they are time invariant and, therefore, collinear with the individual fixed effects. Table 11 shows the results of the regression above. These regressions use the predicted probabilities of incarceration from the estimates in Column 2 of Table 10 . Table 11 
Limitations of this study
While this research provides some compelling evidence that increased availability of criminal background data is associated with worse labor market outcomes for ex-offenders, there are a few caveats. First, as in most studies of the differences between ex-offenders and non-offenders, there is a limited number of observations on the ex-offenders. Moreover, few ex-offender observations occur in the time period before most states adopted Internet background checks sites. 7
This weakens the identification of any effects of open records, since the comparisons are primarily based on cross-sectional ones, rather than longitudinal comparisons.
Conclusion
This paper examines how employer access to criminal history data influences the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders. I find evidence that negative employment effects of incarceration last longer in states that provide criminal history records over the Internet than in states that do not.
There is some evidence that ex-offenders in states with open records policies have lower wages than ex-offenders in states with more closed records policies.
In general, the estimates from the non-offender regressions are not estimated precisely enough to draw many conclusions about the effects of more available criminal records on the labor market outcomes of non-offenders. Moreover, it would be difficult to draw many conclusions about employer statistical discrimination on the basis of this evidence.
This research is important for understanding why released prisoners experience poor labor market outcomes. The labor market outcomes of ex-offenders are a public finance concern because failure to gain legitimate employment after prison release is a good predictor of recidivism, which is costly for public prison systems. Regression estimates indicate that more widely available criminal history data worsens the labor market outcomes of ex-offenders. There is less consistent
evidence that more open records lengthen the effects of incarceration. This research also has provides some limited evidence on how the high relative rates of incarceration for black and Hispanic men affect the employment outcomes of non-offenders from those groups. Notes: -Standard errors in brackets.
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-Sample includes NLSY97 respondents who have never been incarcerated as adults -Employment-status regressions are linear probability models.
-Full regression results available from the author upon request. Notes: -Standard errors in brackets.
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-Full regression results available from the author upon request. 
